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Introduction
An expectant mother jolts awake as a sharp pain rips through her
stomach. She feels the warm sensation of blood spreading down her leg,
her hands frantically grasp her stomach as another contraction tears
through her. Her inhuman wail pierces the night air and tears stream
down her face as she realizes her worst nightmare is coming true; she is
having a miscarriage.1 She has lost the child she has wanted for so long,

1.

See, e.g., Miscarriage, Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, http://americanpregnancy.
org/pregnancy-complications/miscarriage/ [https://perma.cc/NST5-JXND]
(last updated Dec. 5, 2017) (listing the symptoms of miscarriage).
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less than forty-eight hours after having an amniocentesis to test for fetal
abnormalities.2
Miscarriage is one of a multitude of serious complications expectant
mothers must weigh when deciding if they should have an
amniocentesis.3 To determine if her child has any number of genetic
abnormalities, an expectant mother would have a long needle inserted
into her stomach, the needle would penetrate the uterus and amniotic
sac, and extract amniotic fluid for testing.4 This amniocentesis
procedure carries serious risk of miscarriage, needle injury to the fetus,
fetal infection, and other complications.5
Today, a revolutionary breakthrough in prenatal care means
women no longer have to struggle to decide between important fetal
testing and the catastrophic risks associated with amniocentesis. Drs.
Lo and Wainscoat discovered that maternal plasma and serum, which
had previously been discarded as medical waste, contained cell-free fetal
DNA (cffDNA).6 Lo and Wainscoat were able to develop a method to
detect the small fraction of paternally inherited cffDNA in maternal
plasma to determine fetal abnormalities.7 This breakthrough has
revolutionized prenatal care, offering women a safe alternative to highrisk, invasive testing; cffDNA testing is now offered in over ninety
countries and is on track to be a first-tier prenatal screen for all
pregnant women.8
There is no doubt that Lo and Wainscoat’s invention has
revolutionized prenatal care.9 The Supreme Court’s current patent-

2.

See Amniocentesis, NHS, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/amniocentesis/
risks/ [https://perma.cc/BS4P-DSVD] (last updated Apr. 21, 2016) (stating
that most miscarriages due to amniocentesis occur less than three days after
the procedure is done).

3.

See Amniocentesis Risks, Mayo Clinic, https://www.mayoclinic.org/
tests-procedures/amniocentesis/about/pac-20392914 [https://perma.cc/
F4CH-FTSK] (last updated Nov. 8, 2018).

4.

See Amniocentesis, John Hopkins Med., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.
org/healthlibrary/test_procedures/gynecology/amniocentesis_procedure
_92,P07762 [https://perma.cc/2YXW-K2XE] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019)
(explaining what happens during an amniocentesis).

5.

Mayo Clinic, supra note 3.

6.

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2015).

7.

Id.

8.

Robert Cook-Deegan & Subhashini Chandrasekharan, Sequenom v.
Ariosa—The Death of a Genetic Testing Patent, 375 New Eng. J. Med.
2418, 2418 (2016).

9.

See Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
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eligibility test, the Mayo/Alice two-step,10 however, threatens the
future of such ground breaking inventions. The Mayo/Alice two-step
analysis of patent eligibility first requires a determination of whether
the claims at issue are directed to a law of nature, natural phenomenon,
or abstract idea.11 If the claims are directed to one of these patentineligible concepts, the second step of the analysis determines if there
is an “inventive concept.”12 The Court described an inventive concept
as “an element or combination of elements that ‘is sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’”13
The Mayo/Alice two-step has proven to be unworkable and has
resulted in significant uncertainty in biotechnology. The test has been
described as “being both indeterminate, as no one is certain how it will
be applied in any particular case, and overly restrictive,” as the test has
been applied to invalidate a wide range of patents.14 As a result of the
Mayo/Alice test, a large number of life-saving, meritorious inventions
are being rejected or invalidated for being directed towards patentineligible subject matter.15 The uncertainty surrounding biotechnology
patent protection has significantly contributed to the weakening of the
U.S. patent system16 and has led to one commentator calling the Mayo
decision “the worst, most wrongly decided case by the Supreme Court

10.

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012);
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); see Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
s2106.html [https://perma.cc/U4F4-2UMJ] (last modified Jan. 24, 2018)
(referring to the “Alice/Mayo two-part test”).

11.

Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.

12.

Id.

13.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

14.

Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent
Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 939, 952 (2017).

15.

See Bernard Chao, USPTO is Rejecting Potentially Life-Saving
Inventions, Law360 (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/
604808/uspto-is-rejecting-potentially-life-saving-inventions [https://perma.cc/
DW8W-5P79].

16.

See Gene Quinn, The Top 3 Reasons the U.S. Patent System in Decline,
IPWatchdog (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/04/
26/top-3-reasons-u-s-patent-system-decline/id=82571/ [https://perma.cc/
VZ9F-6UV5] (stating that, in 2017, the United States fell to a tenth-place
tie with Hungary in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce world rankings for
patent protection, and listing uncertainty in patent eligibility as a
significant contributing factor to the decline in the strength to the U.S.
patent system).
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in the patent field ever.”17 Without a change to the current Mayo/Alice
two-step approach to determining patent-eligible subject matter, the
Supreme Court risks hindering the development of innovations, the very
thing the patent system seeks to protect.18
Part I of this Note discusses why a strong U.S. patent system is
crucial to the advancement of biotechnology and medical innovation.
Parts II and III explore the development of the modern patent statute
and the inconsistent judicial treatment of the eligible subject matter
requirement. Parts IV and V describe the Mayo/Alice two-step and the
effects of the test on patent eligibility. Part VI discusses the rise in the
dismissal of claims based on motions to dismiss since the adoption of
the Mayo/Alice two-step. Part VII compares the Vanda decision and
the Mayo decision. Part VIII details the consequences of leaving the
Mayo/Alice two-step intact. Part IX of this Note discusses the current
push for overturning the Mayo/Alice test through statutory
amendment and details why this is not an adequate solution. Finally,
the Conclusion develops a new test for determining what constitutes
patent-eligible subject matter and highlights the benefits of the
proposed test.

I.

The Need for a Strong U.S. Patent System

Patents have been a driving force behind innovation in the United
States since the country’s founding. Patent rights, considered
fundamental by the Framers, are recognized in the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution.19 The Framers believed patent rights to be
so critical to the success of the United States that the only mention of
the word “right” in the original Constitution is found in that clause.20
The original patent statute was passed in the Second Session of the
First Congress.21 Abraham Lincoln, a patent holder himself, recognized

17.

Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent
Court Wreaking Havoc on Patents, IPWatchdog (Jan. 23, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23/mayo-v-prometheus-lawlessdecision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/ [https://perma.cc/PB5Y-AS49].

18.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to issue patents
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).

19.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the
Constitution, Perfect Together, IPWatchdog (Feb. 19, 2018), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/patents-copyrights-constitution/id=
93941/ [https://perma.cc/NC2K-EQGT].

20.

Quinn, supra note 19.

21.

Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (“[P]romot[ing] the progress of
useful Arts . . . .”); Quinn, supra note 19.
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that “[t]he patent system . . . added the fuel of interest to the fire of
genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful things.”22
Patent protection has played a major role in the development of
some of the most prominent and ground-breaking inventions in the
United States.23 Patent rights are intended to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful arts.”24 By granting an inventor a limited right of
exclusion, patent law provides incentive for inventors to risk the
enormous costs involved in developing new technologies. This incentive
promotes the development of new technologies, and has a positive
impact on society.25 To obtain this limited right of exclusion, an
inventor must provide an adequate disclosure of the claimed invention.26
Patent law thus encourages inventors to disclose their inventions to the
public, rather than maintain them in secret for their own benefit. Such
public disclosure stimulates ideas and leads to the eventual
development of further significant advances in technology.27
In a strong patent system, patent rights are granted to particular
inventions in a predictable manner, and patent infringement similarly
is enforced in a predictable manner. A predictable patent system
provides inventors with the ability to protect their rewards for
successful inventions and to make educated decisions on where to
allocate resources when developing new technologies.28
The United States has long been considered to have the “gold
standard” patent system and to be the world leader in securing patent
protection for innovative, next-wave technologies.29 The United States
developed its “gold standard” patent system “precisely because it
consistently secured legal protections for the fruits of inventors’ labor.”30
22.

Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (1858–
59), in Abraham Lincoln Online (original emphasis omitted), http://
www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/discoveries.htm [https://
perma.cc/V82V-7AMB] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).

23.

Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at The
Economic Contribution of Technology Licensing Conference: The Case for
a Strong Patent System 4 (June 8, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_statements/958603/160608strongpatentsystem.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87SA-SCCT].

24.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

25.

Kewanne Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).

26.

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); Kewanne, 416 U.S. at 480–81.

27.

Kewanne, 416 U.S. at 481.

28.

Richard S. Gruner, Why We Need a Strong Patent System and When:
Filling the Void Left by the Bilski Case, 28 Santa Clara Computer &
High Tech. L.J. 499, 543 (2011).

29.

Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 14, at 942.

30.

Id.
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In the 1980s, when other countries were hesitating to grant patent
protection to cutting-edge innovations in the emerging, highly
controversial field of biotechnology, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
theses biotechnology innovations should be promoted and protected.31
The Supreme Court’s holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty32 recognized
that the results of biotechnology research may be directed to eligible
subject matter.33 The Chakrabarty decision has been cited by
commentators as a driving force behind revolutionary advances in life
science technology and medical treatment.34
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, Harvard
College secured a patent on the oncomouse.35 The oncomouse is a mouse
that has been genetically modified to incorporate a cancer-promoting
gene into its genome,36 resulting in a multitude of opportunities to
research cancer development and treatment.37 While the United States
issued a patent on the oncomouse approximately four years after the
initial filing of the patent application,38 other countries, such as Canada,
rejected the application outright. The oncomouse patent was subject to
a long series of rejections, court appeals, and remands before the
European Patent Office ultimately granted the patent in 2004, nearly
two decades after the issuance of the U.S. patent.39 Europe’s delay in
granting patent protection gave the United States the edge in the
biotechnology field. By securing patent rights in biotechnology
inventions early on, the United States “became the birthplace of the
biotech revolution” while Europe lost the “competitive and commercial
edge in biotechnology.”40

II. The Development of the Modern Patent Statute
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must file an application
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that

31.

Id. at 943–44.

32.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).

33.

See infra Part III(B) (discussing the Chakrabarty approach to eligible
subject matter).

34.

Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 14, at 943.

35.

U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988).

36.

Id. at col. 1 ll. 30–56.

37.

Id. at col. 3 ll. 16–59.

38.

See ‘866 Patent (showing a filing date of June 22, 1984 and an issuance
date of April 12, 1988).

39.

Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 14, at 944.

40.

Id.
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meets several requirements.41 The patent application is then examined
by the USPTO to determine if the application meets the statutory
requirements laid out in the patent statute.42
The modern patent framework was adopted in the Patent Act of
1952.43 Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, the statutory requirements for
patentability were concise and grouped into only two statutory
sections.44 The Patent Act of 1952 organized the statutory requirements
into their present, individual sections. The specification requirement
necessitates that the specification “contain a written description of the
invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use
the same.”45 This requirement also mandates that “[t]he specification
shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards
as the invention.”46 The invention must also be novel47 and non-obvious
to a person having ordinary skill in the art.48
Additionally, an invention must satisfy the eligibility requirement
of section 101 to be considered patentable.49 Section 101 of the patent
statute provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”50
Thus, to satisfy the eligibility requirement an invention must possess
utility and be directed to eligible subject matter. The eligibility
requirement is also referred to as patent-eligibility or the patent-eligible
subject matter requirement.
The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act reveals that section
101 merely identifies subject matter that may be patented, if the other
41.

35 U.S.C. § 111 (2012).

42.

See Patent Process Overview, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patentsgetting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/utility-patent/
patent-process-0 [https://perma.cc/GB3B-LXYE] (last modified Nov. 24,
2014) (outlining the process for obtaining a patent).

43.

Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1–390 (2012)).

44.

Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7 §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 109 (“[P]romot[ing] the progress
of useful Arts . . . .”) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100–105
(2012)).

45.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).

46.

§ 112(b).

47.

§ 102.

48.

§ 103.

49.

§ 101.

50.

§ 101.
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statutory requirements of the patent statute, such as novelty, are
satisfied. Furthermore, “the drafters explained that while [section] 101
would still include the word ‘new,’ [section] 102 [novelty] provides ‘in
effect, an amplification and definition of “new” in [section] 101.’”51
Satisfaction of section 101 alone is, therefore, not sufficient to grant
an invention patent protection. After an invention satisfies the
eligibility requirement, it must still be found to be novel and nonobvious as compared to prior art. To evaluate if an invention is patent
eligible, one must understand the role of each section of the Patent Act
and view each requirement in the context of the patent statute as a
whole. It is not the sole job of section 101 to eliminate patentability for
unmeritorious claims. Consequently, “there is no need to twist the
language of [section] 101 for policy reasons to ensure that unmeritorious
inventions are not patentable.”52 Rather, section 101 was meant to be
the first stepping stone in determining if an invention is patent eligible.
However, case law has imposed more stringent restrictions on
patent-eligible subject matter. Since the 1800s, courts have recognized
exceptions to what subject matter is considered patent eligible.
Notably, laws of nature, natural phenomena, mental steps, and
mathematical algorithms are not considered to be directed to patenteligible subject matter.53 Courts have struggled, however, with
determining what is a patent-eligible invention and an unpatentable
principle since the beginning of the patent system.54 This struggle has
led the Supreme Court to take conflicting approaches to analyzing
patent eligibility over the years.55

51.

David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 157, 173
(2016).

52.

Id. at 175.

53.

Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 591, 596
(2008) (citing multiple sources).

54.

Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 565,
566 (2015).

55.

See, e.g., Michael A. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility in Biotechnology: A Look
Under the Hood, 45 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Sanzo, Patent
Eligibility]; Michael A. Sanzo, The Patenting of Gene Based Diagnostic
Assays in a Post Mayo and Myriad World, 16 J. Marshall Rev. Intell.
Prop. L. 1 (2016) (discussing the Supreme Court’s inconsistent treatment
of patent-eligible subject matter in different cases).
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III. Judicial Treatment of Eligible Subject Matter
The Supreme Court’s conflicting approach to the eligibility
requirement is exemplified in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co.56 and Diamond v. Chakrabarty.57
A.

Funk Brothers Approach to Eligible Subject Matter

The Funk Brothers approach to analyzing patent eligible subject
matter begins with analyzing each element of a claim individually to
determine if the element encompasses an abstract idea, natural
phenomenon, or law of nature. If one of these judicial exceptions is
present in any individual element of the claim, the court determines if
any other element of the claim conveys an inventive concept.58 This
approach to analyzing eligible subject matter has essentially been
adopted by the Supreme Court in its Mayo/Alice framework.59
The patent at issue in Funk Brothers claimed an inoculant
comprised of a variety of different bacteria that had been individually
isolated and recombined based on their compatibility.60 The claimed
inoculant was able to infect various types of leguminous plants and fix
nitrogen to promote the plants’ growth.61
While the Funk Brothers case was decided prior to the adoption of
the modern patent statute, the Court’s analysis seems to be clearly
directed to patent eligibility.62 The Court found the patent claims at
issue unpatentable, and therefore invalid, because “[t]heir qualities are
the work of nature.”63 The qualities of the claimed bacteria were, the
Court reasoned, “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They
are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”64 The Court further found that a discovery of a
law of nature only results in an invention if the law of nature is applied
to “a new and useful end.”65
As the opinion continues, however, the Court’s focus on patent
eligible subject matter begins to overlap with the requirements of

56.

333 U.S. 127 (1948).

57.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).

58.

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.

59.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 2.

60.

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129–30.

61.

Id. at 128–29.

62.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 5.

63.

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.
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novelty and non-obviousness. The Court found that the combination of
the bacteria claimed did not result in any species of bacteria acquiring
a different use and that each species maintained its original function.66
This analysis seems to be directed to the concept of non-obviousness.
An invention is obvious if it is a “combination of familiar elements
according to known methods” that “does no more than yield predictable
results.”67 The Court goes on to analyze the novelty of the claimed
bacteria combination, noting that while new, the claimed combination
was still unpatentable.68 The Court’s analysis suggests the concepts of
novelty and non-obviousness, or “inventiveness,” and patent-eligible
subject matter are considered jointly. This joint consideration of these
distinct patentability requirements is unsurprising for the time, as these
concepts were not separated into individual statutory requirements
until four years after Funk Brothers was decided.69 However, later
decisions have continued to assume that these requirements are
connected.70
The Supreme Court’s decision in Funk Brothers caused a great deal
of alarm in the patent community, particularly among those in the
pharmaceutical industry. The patent community recognized that Funk
Brothers required an inventive application as a condition of
patentability, which departed from the historical standard of patent
eligibility.71 The pharmaceutical industry was so concerned by Funk
Brothers that it raised the issue in the hearings preceding the adoption
of the 1952 Patent Act.72 A representative of the pharmaceutical
industry urged Congress to clarify that newly discovered laws of nature
remained patentable if they were embodied in new and useful
applications.73 While never explicitly stated, it is believed that with the
adoption of sections 100 and 101 of the 1952 Patent Act, Congress
intended to overrule Funk Brothers.74 In section 100, Congress defined
“invention” as an “invention or discovery.”75 Additionally, the term
66.

Id. at 131.

67.

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).

68.

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131–32.

69.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 5.

70.

Id.

71.

Lefstin, supra note 54, at 631–32.

72.

Id. at 632.

73.

Id. (citing Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearing on H.R. 3760
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 116–
18 (1951)) (statement of I. J. Fellner, Manager, Patent Department, Dr.
Salsbury’s Laboratories).

74.

Id. at 633–34.

75.

35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2012).
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“process” was defined as a “process, art or method, and includes a new
use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter,
or material.”76 The definitions laid out in this section of the 1952 Patent
Act suggest that Congress heeded the warning of the pharmaceutical
industry and abolished the inventive application required by Funk
Brothers.77
While it appears that Congress intended to overrule Funk Brothers
when adopting the 1952 Patent Act, the Supreme Court continued to
apply a Funk Brothers type of analysis when determining patent
eligibility. In Parker v. Flook,78 the Supreme Court persisted in its belief
that patent eligibility and “inventiveness” are connected.79 The claims
in Flook were directed to a method for updating alarm limits. The only
novel feature of the method, according to the Court, was a
mathematical formula. The Court then analyzed whether the
application of this formula made the claims eligible for patent
protection.80 The Court determined that the approach taken in Funk
Brothers was the appropriate analysis for the Flook claims. The Court
went on to find that the novelty of the mathematical formula is not a
determining factor in patent eligibility, rather the process itself must
be new and useful.81 The Court, therefore, analyzed the claims after
excluding the mathematical formula and found them invalid because
they contained no patentable invention.82
Foreshadowing the response to the Mayo/Alice test, Flook argued
that the Court’s analysis of patent-eligible subject matter improperly
imported the concerns of sections 102 and 103 into its section 101
analysis.83 The Court rejected this argument, finding that it was “based
on two fundamental misconceptions.”84 First, the Court stated that a
narrow reading of section 101 was untenable because it would make a
determination of patent eligibility depend on “draftsman’s art.”85 Such
an interpretation would not, according to the Court, serve the principles
underlying the exclusion of patents on abstract ideas, laws of nature,
and natural phenomena. The Court ignored the definition of invention
76.

§ 100(b).

77.

Lefstin, supra note 54, at 634.

78.

437 U.S. 584 (1978).

79.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 7.

80.

Flook, 437 U.S. at 585.

81.

Id. at 591.

82.

Id. at 594.

83.

Id. at 592–94.

84.

Id. at 592.

85.

Id. at 593.
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and discovery outlined by Congress in section 100 of the 1952 Patent
Act and reasoned, “[t]he rule that the discovery of a law of nature
cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena
are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding
that they are not the kind of ‘discoveries’ that the statute was intended
to protect.”86 Second, the Court found that Flook’s argument was based
on the flawed belief that the claim was rejected merely for the fact that
one component consisted of unpatentable subject matter.87 Flook
argued that the Court’s analysis was inconsistent with decisions by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the precursor to the Federal
Circuit) that required claims to be considered as a whole. The Court
maintained that, despite considering the individual elements of the
claim without accounting for the mathematical formula, the claims were
analyzed as a whole.88
The approach to patent-eligible subject matter established in Funk
Brothers and Flook blurred the line between patent eligibility and
inventiveness. These cases made clear that inventiveness, while closely
related to the concepts of novelty and non-obviousness, differs from
these requirements because all the elements of the claim are not
considered when determining inventiveness.89 Elements present in the
claim that are found to be excluded from section 101 are not taken into
account when evaluating the inventiveness of the claim.90
B.

Chakrabarty Approach to Eligible Subject Matter

Just two years after deciding Flook, the Court took a different
approach to analyzing patent-eligible subject matter in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.91 Chakrabarty invented a human-made, genetically
engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil. The ability
to break down crude oil is not possessed by any naturally occurring
bacteria, making Chakrabarty’s invention significantly valuable in
treating oil spills.92
Unlike its opinion in Flook, the Court in Chakrabarty began its
analysis with a construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court determined,
based on the text of the statute, as well as the legislative history, that
“Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given
wide scope” and “include anything under the sun that is made by
86.

Id.

87.

Id. at 593–94.

88.

Id. at 594.

89.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 6.

90.

Id.

91.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).

92.

Id. at 305.
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man.”93 Despite interpreting section 101 to have a wide scope, the Court
acknowledged that section 101 has limits and does not embrace every
discovery. Consequently, “a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise,
Einstein could not have patented his celebrated E = mc2; nor could
Newton have patented the law of gravity.”94
After its statutory interpretation, the Court proceeded to analyze
the claims of the patent. Unlike in Funk Brothers and Flook, however,
the Court analyzed the claims in their entirety and not the individual
elements of the claims. Consequently, the Court found that the claims
“plainly qualif[y] as patentable subject matter” because they were
directed to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter.95 In finding the claims patent eligible, the Court focused on the
significant amount of human intervention in the claims, as well as the
markedly different characteristics of the bacteria from any found in
nature and the significant utility of the claimed bacteria.96
Despite the differences in analysis between Chakrabarty and Funk
Brothers/Flook, the Court fails to acknowledge these differences.
Rather, the Court attempts to distinguish the cases based on factual
differences.97 The Court reasoned that the claims in Funk Brothers were
directed to bacteria that existed in nature, while the bacterium claimed
in Chakrabarty was not found in nature.98 This analysis fails to
recognize, however, that the bacteria in Funk Brothers were a
component of the claimed invention, not the invention itself. The
individual strains of bacteria in the Funk Brothers claim are, therefore,
analogous to the genes used to create the bacterium in Chakrabarty.
The distinction between Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty, therefore, lies
in how the claims are analyzed and not the factual distinctions between
the cases.99
The Chakrabarty approach to patent-eligible subject matter was
also embraced by the Court one year later in Diamond v. Diehr.100 The
claims in Diehr were directed to a process for curing synthetic rubber.
The Court found the process in Diehr directed to patent-eligible subject
matter because, while the claims employed a mathematical equation,
they were not directed solely to the equation. The claims did not
93.

Id. at 307–09.

94.

Id. at 309.

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 310.

97.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 9–10.

98.

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.

99.

Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 9–10.

100. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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preempt every use of the equation, rather the claims only foreclosed use
of the equation in combination with the other steps of the process.101
After finding the claims directed to patent-eligible subject matter, the
Court explicitly stated the need to analyze claims as a whole when
determining patent eligibility. Furthermore, the need to analyze claims
as a whole is particularly relevant in a process claim “because a new
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though all
the constituents of the combination are well known and in common use
before the combination was made.”102 While this Chakrabarty wholeclaim approach to patent-eligibility analysis remains contradictory to
the Funk Brothers/Flook approach, the Court again attempted to
distinguish these cases based on factual differences.103 The Court fails
to realize, however, that the claims in Flook may be found valid as
directed to an improvement in a process under the Chakrabarty/Diehr
approach. The difference in outcome between Diehr and Flook, thus,
appears to be based on the analytical approach and not factual
differences between the cases.104
C.

The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of Conflicting Supreme Court
Precedent

For the next three decades the Supreme Court did not address
eligible subject matter. During this time, the Federal Circuit searched
for a workable test, consistent with the Supreme Court’s conflicting
precedent, to determine if a claim was directed to patent-eligible subject
matter.105 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit adopted the “machine-ortransformation” test as the sole test for determining patent eligibility.
The Federal Circuit believed this test was consistent with Supreme
Court’s fluctuating precedent on patent-eligible subject matter.106
Under the “machine-or-transformation” test, an invention is directed to
patent-eligible subject matter if it is tied to a particular machine or it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.107
The Supreme Court, however, did not agree that the “machine-ortransformation” test was the sole means for determining patent-eligible

101. Id. at 187.
102. Id. at 188.
103. Id. at 185–87.
104. Sanzo, Patent Eligibility, supra note 55, at 5.
105. Gruner, supra note 28, at 583–92.
106. Id. at 590. See generally Benjamin J. McEniery, The Federal Circuit in
Bilski: The Machine-or-Transformation Test, 91 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc’y 253 (2009) (discussing the Federal Circuits adoption of the
machine-or-transformation test).
107. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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subject matter. In Bilski v. Kappos,108 the Court explicitly rejected the
test as the sole means of determining patent-eligible subject matter.
The “machine-or-transformation” test was, according to the Court,
merely a helpful clue in determining patent eligibility.109 Despite
rejecting the test as the sole means of determining patent eligibility,
the Court did not provide any additional guidance in how to analyze
patent eligibility, and merely referred back to its prior patent-eligibility
case law.110 After Bilski, however, the Court appeared to develop a
renewed interest in patent eligibility and issued four opinions on the
subject within four years.111 These decisions culminated with the
Court’s adoption of the Mayo/Alice two-step approach to analyzing
patent-eligible subject matter.

IV. The Mayo/Alice Two-Step
In 2012, the Court issued a highly anticipated opinion in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,112 a decision
many in the patent community hoped would clarify how to analyze
patent eligibility. Mayo concerned two patents directed towards the use
of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune disorders.113 The
claims were directed to three steps: administering the drug, determining
the amount of the drug in a patient’s blood sample, and a “wherein”
step that correlates the drug level with a need to increase or decrease
the amount of drug administered to the patient.114
In analyzing the claims, the Court first found that the patents “set
forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between concentrations of
certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of
thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”115 The Court then
looked to see if the claims “do significantly more than simply describe
the natural relations.”116 In analyzing this question, the Court found
that the claims do not add significantly more to the law of nature:
108. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
109. Id. at 604.
110. Gruner, supra note 28, at 592.
111. See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014).
112. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
113. Id. at 73.
114. Id. at 74–75.
115. Id. at 77.
116. Id.
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“[T]he claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature;
any additional steps consist of well-understood, routine, conventional
activity already engaged in by the scientific community . . . .”117
Additionally, “simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high
level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas cannot make those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”118
What the Court failed to emphasize is that the steps in Mayo were
“routine” and “conventional” because “scientists already understood
that the levels in a patient’s blood of certain metabolites . . . were
correlated with the likelihood that a particular dosage of a thiopurine
drug could cause harm or prove ineffective.”119
The Court’s analysis of patent eligibility is driven by a concern of
preemption. Consequently, claims that are directed to a law of nature,
abstract idea, or natural phenomenon which preempt all other potential
uses are not patent eligible.120 The Court expresses concern that while
granting patent rights for the discovery of new laws of nature may
encourage their discovery, “there is a danger that the grant of patents
that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised upon them”
and “otherwise foreclose[] more future invention than the underlying
discovery could reasonably justify.”121
To support its preemption concern, the Court cites O’Reilly v.
Morse.122 After inventing the telegraph, Morse attempted to claim the
exclusive right to all devices using electricity to print characters at a
distance.123 The Court, however, held this claim invalid because it was
too broad and preempted uses of the technology that Morse had not
invented.124 In Mayo, the Court uses this same logic to hold that the
claims at issue preempt all uses of the law of nature and are invalid.125
While the concern of preemption is valid, the reliance on Morse to
support holding claims invalid under section 101 is misplaced. While
Morse is concerned with preemption, the Morse Court anchors this
concern in the requirements of written description and enablement, not
in patent eligibility.126
117. Id. at 79–80.
118. Id. at 82.
119. Id. at 73–74.
120. Id. at 85–87.
121. Id. at 86.
122. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
123. Id. at 112.
124. Id. at 112–13.
125. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86–87.
126. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113 (“[H]e claims an exclusive right to use a
manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not
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Despite outrage from the patent community following the decision
in Mayo,127 the Court doubled down on its two-step approach to eligible
subject matter in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.128 The Court
affirmed that the two-step approach established in Mayo was the
appropriate test for all claims directed toward laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas:
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to
one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us?” . . . We have described step
two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e.,
an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”129

The Court continued to anchor the concern behind the exclusionary
principle that inventions must be directed to patent-eligible subject
matter as one of preemption. The Court noted that “[l]aws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are the basic tools of scientific
and technological work. [M]onopolization of those tools through the
grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would
tend to promote it, thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent
laws.”130 Notably, the Court cautioned:
[W]e tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest
it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions . . .
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered
ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract
concept.131

invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his patent.”);
see, e.g., Jacob Adam Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the
Quid Pro Quo Since 1793, 21 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 63, 73–75 (2010) (discussing the historical development of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112).
127. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo
v. Prometheus, IPWatchdog (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.
com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/ [https://
perma.cc/UR3X-S5Q5] (discussing how the Court’s decision in Mayo
failed to take basic patent law principles into account and explaining why
the case was wrongly decided).
128. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
129. Id. at 2355 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 2354 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
131. Id. at 2354 (citations omitted).
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However, application of the Mayo/Alice two-step has proceeded to
swallow biotechnology patents whole.132

V. Two-Stepping Through the Patent-Eligibility
Wasteland
Since the development of the Mayo/Alice two-step, patents are
being rejected and invalidated at an alarming rate. The deleterious
effects of the Mayo/Alice framework are being felt from the USPTO133
to the Federal Circuit.134
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.135 is frequently cited as
a clear illustration of the negative effect of the Mayo/Alice test on
biotechnology patents.136 The Federal Circuit held Sequenom’s
invention137 invalid for not satisfying section 101 as analyzed under the
Mayo/Alice framework, despite finding the invention “a significant
contribution to the medical field.”138 The Federal Circuit found
Sequenom’s patent directed to a natural phenomenon—the presence of
cffDNA in maternal plasma.139 Consequently, the court proceeded to
analyze the claims for an inventive step sufficient to transform the
132. See infra Parts VI–VIII.
133. See, e.g., James Cosgrove, § 101 Rejections in the Post-Alice Era,
IPWatchdog (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/07/
101-rejections-post-alice-era/id=78635/ [https://perma.cc/NV9A-FHDP]
(analyzing the increase in section 101 rejections issued by the USPTO
post-Alice and the success rate of overcoming section 101 rejections).
134. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the
Law by Saying Nothing?, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 765, 767 (2018) (stating that
in post-Alice patent-eligible subject matter cases, the Federal Circuit has
found only 7.7 percent of challenged patents valid).
135. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
136. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Denies Cert. in Sequenom v. Ariosa
Diagnostics, IPWatchdog (June 27, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2016/06/27/70409/id=70409/ [https://perma.cc/5YBF-9KPX] (discussing
how the Supreme Court denied certiorari despite the harm to the life
sciences that the Federal Circuit’s decision caused); Michael J. Flibbert
& Emily R. Gabranski, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom Among the Most
Important Federal Circuit Decisions from 2015, Finnegan: Fed. Cir. IP
Blog (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/
federal-circuit-ip/ariosa-diagnostics-v-sequenom-among-the-most-importantfederal-circuit-decisions-from-2015.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/W934CSYJ] (discussing the importance of the Ariosa decision and how it could
result in natural product and diagnostic method patents becoming more
difficult to obtain and enforce).
137. See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text.
138. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379–80.
139. Id. at 1376.
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naturally occurring phenomenon into a patentable invention. The
Federal Circuit held that the steps of DNA amplification and detection
were “well-understood, routine, and conventional activity” at the time
the method was developed.140 Consequently, the method “amounts to a
general instruction to doctors to apply routine, conventional techniques
when seeking to detect cffDNA.”141 Additionally, the Federal Circuit
held “the only subject matter new and useful as of the date of the
application was the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal
plasma or serum.”142 Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s
emphasis on preemption driving the need for the Mayo/Alice test, the
Federal Circuit found Sequenom’s argument that the claims of the
patent have a narrow preemptive scope unpersuasive.143
Judge Linn wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the
majority’s analysis under the Mayo/Alice test but expressed strong
disapproval of the test and its result.144 Linn criticized the Mayo/Alice
two-step as overly broad and resulting in the invalidation of otherwise
valid, meritorious patents.145 Linn aptly noted that the claims at issue
in Sequenom’s patent were unlike those in Mayo, because “no one was
amplifying and detecting paternally inherited cffDNA using the plasma
or serum of pregnant mothers.”146 Consequently, Linn felt that
Sequenom’s patent was “truly meritorious” and “deserving of patent
protection.”147
Sequenom appealed the Federal Circuit’s decision to the Supreme
Court. Bolstered by Judge Linn’s critical concurring opinion, many in
the patent community were hopeful the Supreme Court would grant
certiorari.148 In a decision that shocked many in the biotechnology and
patent community, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.149

140. Id. at 1377.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1378–79.
144. Id. at 1380 (Linn, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 1380–81.
146. Id. at 1381.
147. Id.
148. See David Tellekson & Jessica Kaempf, Litigation Alert: Federal Circuit’s
Ariosa Decision, Good Chance for Rehearing En Banc, Fenwick & West
LLP (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/
federal-circuits-ariosa-decision.aspx [https://perma.cc/N8ZP-3A6M] (stating
that Judge Linn’s concurrence may be an invitation for further clarity from
the Supreme Court regarding patent eligibility).
149. Id.

749

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
Two-Stepping Through Alice's Wasteland of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter

Ariosa is merely one example of truly meritorious, life-saving
patents that have been refused patent protection by the USPTO or
invalidated by the courts under the Mayo/Alice two-step.150 These
inventions are often directed to innovations that vastly improve
diagnostics and treatments. The Patent and Trial Appeal Board
(PTAB) has relied on the Mayo/Alice two-step to reject a method for
diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease.151 The method, based on measuring the
amount of a metabolite in the cerebrospinal fluid of a subject, shows
enhanced specificity and sensitivity over prior Alzheimer’s diagnostic
methods.152 The PTAB found the relationship between the metabolite
level and Alzheimer’s disease to be a law of nature. In its search for an
inventive concept, the PTAB dissected and analyzed each element of
the claims and found that the additional claimed steps were routine or
conventional and did not amount to significantly more than the law of
nature itself.153
The groundbreaking cancer diagnostic method, BRCA testing, has
also been held invalid as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. Certain mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are linked
to the development of breast and ovarian cancer. By testing for
mutations in the BRCA genes, doctors can often determine an
individual’s risk for developing breast or ovarian cancer.154
Consequently, BRCA testing has become a critical tool in determining
an individual’s cancer risk.155 In In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based
Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation,156 however, the Federal
Circuit invalidated this meritorious diagnostic method.
The Federal Circuit analyzed the claims using the Mayo/Alice twostep. Under the first step of the test, the court held that the method
claims recited an abstract mental process of comparing and analyzing

150. See, e.g., Chao, supra note 15 (discussing how in the wake of the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions regarding patent-eligible subject matter many
patents that rely upon a law of nature have been declared patentineligible).
151. Ex parte Myint, No. 2013-009161, 2015 WL 5272660 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2015).
152. U.S. Patent Pub. No. 2011/0065202, at [0003] (filed Mar. 17, 2011).
153. Myint, No. 2013-009161, slip op. at 7–8.
154. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig.,
774 F.3d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
155. See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NIH:
National Cancer Inst., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causesprevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/F48H-99LV] (last
updated Jan. 30, 2018) (explaining the association of the BRCA genes
with cancer risk, the process of BRCA testing, and who should get tested).
156. 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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different gene sequences.157 Proceeding to step two, the court dissected
the claims into individual elements and held that the patent-eligible
elements of the claims were not sufficient to make the claims, as a
whole, patent-eligible; the techniques used to amplify and analyze the
BRCA sequences were routine and ordinary.158 Consequently, the
Federal Circuit held that the method claims were invalid as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.159
The invalidation of the BRCA patents was a particularly stinging
blow as it came after the Supreme Court suggested such method claims
would be patent-eligible. In Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc.,160 the Court analyzed the eligibility of claims
directed to the BRCA gene sequences. The Court held that the
naturally occurring DNA sequence of the gene is a product of nature
and not patent-eligible.161 In its decisions, however, the Court noted
that the case did not “involve patents on new applications of knowledge
about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes” and “[a]s the first party with
knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an
excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its
unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.”162 This statement
by the Supreme Court was dismissed by the Federal Circuit during its
analysis of the BRCA method claims. The Federal Circuit reasoned
that no method claims were actually before the Supreme Court in the
Myriad case. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted that the method
claims contemplated to be patent-eligible in Myriad were narrower in
scope than the claims currently before them.163 This reasoning further
underscores the driving concern of preemption in the Mayo/Alice
analysis of patent eligibility.
In another recent blow to biotechnology and diagnostic patents, the
Federal Circuit upheld a district court decision invalidating three
Cleveland Clinic Foundation patents as being directed to patentineligible subject matter.164 The patents claim methods of assessing a
patient’s risk of cardiovascular disease based on detection of
157. Id. at 763–64.
158. Id. at 764–65.
159. Id. at 765.
160. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
161. Id. at 2111.
162. Id. at 2120 (alteration in original) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
163. In re BRCA, 774 F.3d at 765.
164. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018).
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myeloperoxidase (MPO), an early symptom of cardiovascular disease,
in the patient’s blood sample.165 This new diagnostic method is a
groundbreaking innovation and a substantial breakthrough in the early
detection of cardiovascular disease.166
The Federal Circuit applied the Mayo/Alice two-step analysis and
determined the claims were directed to a law of nature—the presence
of MPO correlates with cardiovascular disease.167 Under step two, the
Federal Circuit dissected the claims into individual elements and
determined there was no inventive concept present because the claims
used known techniques that were routine and conventional. These
routine techniques, consequently, did not suffice to transform the
claimed invention into a patentable method.168
Despite the repeated focus on preemption driving the exclusionary
principle of section 101, the Federal Circuit found no significance in the
fact that the claims of Cleveland Clinic’s diagnostic methods, analyzed
as a whole, had a narrow preemptive scope.169 The Federal Circuit
focused instead on the individual elements of the claims and reasoned
that, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this
case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”170

VI. Determining Patent Eligibility on a Motion to
Dismiss
Since the adoption of the Mayo/Alice two-step, patent eligibility
has increasingly been decided on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.171 The Federal
Circuit has repeatedly recognized that determination of patent
eligibility under section 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper.172
165. Id. at 1355.
166. Corrected Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 56, Cleveland Clinic Found. v.
True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 161766).
167. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1360.
168. Id. at 1362.
169. Id. at 1363.
170. Id. (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
171. See, e.g., Edward Tulin & Leslie Demers, A Look at Post-Alice Rule 12
Motions over the Last 2 Years, Law360 (Jan. 27, 2017); Michael Wilburn
et al., Pretrial Dismissals and Judgments in Post-Alice Courts, Law360
(Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/642593/pretrial-dismissalsand-judgments-in-post-alice-courts [https://perma.cc/Z25A-NTCH].
172. See Genetic Tech. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing OIP Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2015)); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells
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Based on Supreme Court precedent,173 the Federal Circuit has treated
patent eligibility as a threshold legal question based on the claims and
not a predominantly factual inquiry.174 The Federal Circuit has also
stated, however, that subject-matter eligibility can be determined prior
to any formal claim construction, noting that “claim construction is not
an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under [section]
101.”175
Determining patent eligibility on a motion to dismiss is believed to
save the court and the parties time and money, increase judicial
efficiency, and quickly dispose of weak patents which do not meet the
statutory requirements for patentability.176 The Federal Circuit has
recently found, however, that determining patent eligibility before fact
finding and claim construction may be problematic.177 In Berkheimer v.
HP Inc.,178 the Federal Circuit found that while patent-eligible subject
matter is a question of law, the question of whether a claim or claim
element is well-understood, routine, or conventional is a factual
determination.179 Furthermore, a factual issue may arise where the
specification demonstrates that the claims do not describe wellunderstood, routine, and conventional activities.180 A finding of a factual
dispute based on information provided in the specification goes against
Federal Circuit precedent that patent eligibility can be determined by
looking solely at the claims.181 This finding is consistent, however, with

Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014); buySAFE,
Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
173. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2015); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012).
174. Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8–9, Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 17-1437).
175. Merial, 818 F.3d at 1374 (quoting Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
176. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary
on Patent Litigation Best Practices: Section 101 Motions on
Patentable Subject Matter Chapter 2 (2016); Appellee’s Petition
for Rehearing En Banc at 15–16, Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2018) (No. 17-1437).
177. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Aatrix
Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, 882 F.3d 1121, 1125–28 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
178. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
179. Id. at 1368–69.
180. Id. at 1369.
181. See supra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
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the well-established standard that claims are interpreted in light of the
specification.182
Less than a week after issuing the Berkheimer decision, the Federal
Circuit issued another opinion involving underlying issues of fact in
patent eligibility in Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software,
Inc.183 The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that patent eligibility is a
question of law with significant, subsidiary factual questions which
must be resolved prior to making a legal determination.184 In Aatrix,
the Federal Circuit embraced the consideration of extrinsic evidence
when determining patent eligibility. After acknowledging that whether
a claim is well-understood or conventional, the Federal Circuit stated
that, in the current case, this “question cannot be answered adversely
to the patentee based on the sources properly considered on a motion
to dismiss, such as the complaint, the patent, and materials subject to
judicial notice.”185
The recent acknowledgment by the Federal Circuit that patent
eligibility is in part a fundamentally factual inquiry and that the
Mayo/Alice two-step is based upon questions of fact appears at odds
with other Federal Circuit decisions.186 This conflicting approach was
noted, in dissent, by Judge Reyna in Aatrix.187 Judge Reyna stated that
the Federal Circuit’s precedent makes clear that the section 101 inquiry
is one of law.188 Furthermore, shifting the section 101 analysis from a
legal to a factual inquiry “opens the door in both steps of the Alice
inquiry for the introduction of an inexhaustible array of extrinsic
evidence, such as prior art, publications, other patents, and expert
opinion.”189 The discrepancy has resulted in heightened confusion in the
already murky waters of patent-eligibility analysis as lower courts
attempt to discern when patent-eligibility can be decided prior to fact
finding.190
182. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
183. 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
184. Id. at 1128.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., OIP Tech., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (reviewing a section 101 appeal as only an issue of law); Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(same).
187. Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1130 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Vaporstream, Inc. v. Snap Inc., No. 2-17-CV-00220-MLH (KSx),
2018 WL 1116530, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018); Sycamore IP Holdings
LLC v. AT&T Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 620, 650 (E.D. Tex. 2018).
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VII. Drafting Around the Two-Step
The Federal Circuit recently provided a glimmer of hope for the
patent eligibility of diagnostic methods and personalized methods. In
Vanda
Pharmaceuticals
v.
West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals
International,191 the Federal Circuit addressed the patent eligibility of
claims that are very similar to the claims in Mayo. Vanda
Pharmaceuticals is the owner of an exclusive license on a U.S. patent
directed to a method of treating schizophrenics with the drug
iloperidone, wherein the dosage is determined based on the patient’s
genotype.192 The cytochrome P450 2D6 gene (CYP2D6) encodes an
enzyme which metabolizes numerous drugs, including iloperidone.
Certain mutations in the CYP2D6 gene can result in lower CYP2D6
activity. A patient with lower CYP2D6 activity will be a poor
metabolizer of drugs.193 Based on this discovery, the patent at issue
claims a method of treating poor metabolizers, identified through a
genetic test, with lower doses of iloperidone.194
While the claims in Vanda are similar to the patent-ineligible claims
in Mayo, the Federal Circuit held the Vanda claims patent eligible.195
Both the Vanda and Mayo claims correlate a patient’s ability to
metabolize a drug with the proper dosage for the individual.196 Despite
the similarities in the claims, the Federal Circuit found that, unlike
Mayo, the Vanda claims did not set forth merely a natural law. Rather,
the Vanda claims are directed to a method of treating schizophrenia
based on genotyping. The Federal Circuit noted, “[t]he inventors
recognized the relationship between iloperidone [and] CYP2D6
metabolism [], but that is not what they claimed. They claimed an
application of the relationship. Unlike the claim at issue in Mayo, the
claims here require a treating doctor to administer iloperidone.”197
While the claim in Mayo recited administering the drug to a patient, in
Vanda “the claim as a whole was not directed to the administration of
a drug to treat a particular disease.”198 The administering step in Mayo
191. 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
192. Id. at 1121.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1136.
196. See Stephanie Sivinski, Vanda v. West-Ward: This Time, Dosage
Adjustment Claims Are Patent Eligible Subject Matter, IPWatchdog
(May 16, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/16/vanda-v-westward-dosage-adjustment-claims-patent-eligible/id=97117/ [https://perma.cc/
436S-KHTF] (comparing the claims in Mayo and Vanda).
197. Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1135.
198. Id. at 1134.
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was merely a limitation telling doctors to apply a known natural
relationship and “the patent claims do not confine their reach to
particular applications of those laws.”199
Additionally, the Vanda claims do not preempt every use of the
natural relationship between CYP2D6 and iloperidone metabolism.
They “do not ‘tie up the doctor’s subsequent treatment decision.’”200
The Mayo claims, however, merely recognized a need to alter a dose
based on drug metabolism. Thus, the Mayo claims did not actually
involve doctors using the natural relationship between drug metabolism
and dosage. The Vanda claims explicitly recite the limitation of
carrying out a dosage regimen based on genotype testing.201 The claims
require a doctor to administer a certain amount of iloperidone if a
patient is a poor metabolizer and a different amount if the patient is
not a poor metabolizer. This limitation contrasts with the limitation in
Mayo, which merely stated that thiopurine metabolism indicates a need
to adjust the administered dosage.202
In dissent, Chief Judge Prost argued that the majority in Vanda
did not heed the Supreme Court’s warning that patent eligibility should
not depend on drafting efforts.203 Chief Judge Prost found that the
addition of a treatment step with specific dosages of iloperidone was
not sufficient to make the claims patent eligible and did not distinguish
the claims from those in Mayo.204 Additionally, according to the Chief
Judge Prost, while some methods of treatment may be patent eligible,
the Federal Circuit “remain[s] beholden to the holding of Mayo, which
[] requires [the Federal Circuit] to find the claims directed to a natural
law at step one.”205 Furthermore, “the end result of the claimed process
is no more than the conclusion of a natural law” and “[t]he recitation
of the specific dosages adds no more than a conventional application of
that natural law.”206 West-Ward filed a petition for writ of certiorari
echoing Chief Judge Prost’s dissent and asking the Supreme Court to
address whether “patents that claim a method of medically treating a

199. Id. at 1135 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 87 (2012)).
200. Id. at 1135 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Vanda, 887 F.3d at 1142 (Prost, C.J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1142–43.
205. Id. at 1143.
206. Id.
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patient automatically satisfy section 101 of the Patent Act, even if they
apply a natural law using only routine and conventional steps.”207
If the Federal Circuit decision stands, Vanda sets a precedent that
diagnostics may be patent eligible if they include a method of treatment
step. In the wake of the Vanda decision, the USPTO issued a
memorandum addressing the decision and its impact on the patent
eligibility of method of treatment claims.208 The memorandum states
that claims that include a method of treatment step should be
considered patent eligible and are not directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.209 The Vanda decision, as well as the USPTO memo,
imply that diagnostic claims, such as those in Ariosa210 and Cleveland
Clinic211 would have been patent eligible if the claims included a method
of treatment step after diagnosis.
The Vanda decision has provided hope for the patent eligibility of
diagnostic method claims, especially as the Federal Circuit has relied
on Vanda to uphold the validity of claims including a method of
treatment.212 However, it is too soon to determine the impact the case
will have on the future of patent eligibility. The addition of a method
of treatment step to make, an otherwise ineligible, claim patent-eligible,
if reviewed by the Supreme Court, may be viewed as mere “draftsman’s
art.” In Mayo, the Court cautioned that patent statutes should not be
interpreted “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on
draftsman’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles underlying the
prohibition against patents for [natural laws].’”213

207. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda Pharms., 877
F.3d 1117 (2018) (No. 18-817).
208. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Memorandum on Recent Subject Matter
Eligibility Decision: Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward
Pharmaceuticals (June 7, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/memo-vanda-20180607.PDF [https://perma.cc/2SZQ-ESBH].
209. Id. at 2–3.
210. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
211. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2017).
212. Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2019); Natural Alternatives Int’l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918
F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
213. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72
(2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593
(1978)).
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VIII. Consequences of not Replacing the Mayo/Alice
Two-Step
The Mayo/Alice two-step has bred uncertainty and fear in
American inventors and investors. The uncertainty permeating the U.S.
patent system has resulted in the United States continuing its fall in
the ranks of global patent protection.214 The United States is no longer
the “gold standard” for patent protection and will likely continue its
decline if some degree of certainty is not injected into what inventions
are patent eligible.
Under the Mayo/Alice two-step, the oncomouse patent, a driving
force behind the biotechnology boom in the United States,215 would be
invalid for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under
section 101. Under the first step of the Mayo/Alice test, the claims are
directed to a law of nature—the expression of oncogenes promotes the
development of malignant tumors.216 Proceeding to step two, the
remaining elements of the claim recite routine, conventional activity—
introducing an oncogene into germ cells and somatic cells in a nonhuman mammal.217 Researchers had been introducing non-native DNA
into cells through various methods for years prior to the development
of the oncomouse.218 Consequently, the additional elements of the
oncomouse claims do not add sufficiently more to transform the patentineligible law of nature into a patent-eligible invention.
Even Chakrabarty’s oil-destroying bacterium, which paved the way
for the patenting of the oncomouse, would be ineligible under today’s
Mayo/Alice two-step.219 This ineligibility would, furthermore, affect the
majority of patents that paved the way for the biotechnology industry
in the United States.220 Under today’s patent-eligibility standards,
revolutionary breakthroughs that sit at the leading edge of innovation
are being denied patent protection in the United States. Many of these
214. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, U.S. Patent System Falls to 12th Place in Chamber
Global IP Index for 2018, IPWatchdog (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/08/u-s-patent-system-falls-12th-place-chamberglobal-ip-index-2018/id=93494/ [https://perma.cc/9BLM-LTGY] (stating
that the United States fell in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s annual
Global IP Index for the second year in a row).
215. See supra Part I.
216. U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866 col. 1 ll. 37–42 (filed June 22, 1984).
217. Id. at col. 1 ll. 33–34.
218. Id. at col. 1 ll. 4–28.
219. See Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 15-1182).
220. Id.
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innovations, however, are being protected in places such as Europe and
China.221 No longer the “gold standard” in patent protection, the United
States has found itself in the same position as Europe when the Europe
Patent Office hesitated to patent the oncomouse. As inventors and
investors worry about protecting their intellectual property and
recouping their investment, they are sending investments and
innovations overseas to nations with stronger patent protection.222 The
uncertainty in patent eligibility is hampering the progress of diagnostic,
medical, and life science developments in the United States at a time
when the whole world is vying to lead the way in innovation.223
The overreach of the Mayo/Alice framework continues to cause
upheaval and uncertainty for those seeking patent protection in the life
sciences. The Supreme Court’s refusal to grant certiorari in a number
of patent-eligibility cases suggests that the uncertainty, rejections, and
invalidations will continue to plague life science patents. Without an
intervention and change to the current Mayo/Alice two-step approach,
the U.S. patent system will continue to weaken and we will hamper the
progress of life-saving medical innovation.

IX. Correcting the Mayo/Alice Two-Step Through
Statutory Amendment
Despite the need for a new patent-eligibility test, the Supreme
Court appears hesitant to revisit the Mayo/Alice approach to eligible
subject matter. Consequently, some in the patent community have
begun advocating for Congress to overturn the Mayo/Alice two-step
through statutory amendment.224 It is unlikely, however, that amending
221. Gene Quinn, Have We Gone Too Far to Eradicate Weak Patents?,
IPWatchdog (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/08/
gone-too-far-eradicate-weak-patents/id=79248/ [https://perma.cc/6LVRDTFE].
222. See, e.g., id.; Rana Foroohar, A Better US Patent System Will Spur
Innovation, Fin. Times (Sept. 3, 2017), https://amp.ft.com/content/
74114a6c-8f28-11e7-9084-d0c17942ba93 [https://perma.cc/6CBD-5DTP].
223. Steve Brachmann, Patent-Ineligibility of Medical Diagnostics, Life
Sciences Discoveries Arrests U.S. Progress, IPWatchdog (Jan. 7, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/07/patent-ineligibility-medicaldiagnostics-life-sciences-discoveries/id=90805/ [https://perma.cc/8GET4LQ].
224. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 51 (discussing the unworkability of the
Mayo/Alice approach to eligible subject matter and proposing the time
has come to amend the patent statute); David O. Taylor, Amending
Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 2149 (2017) (discussing why
the Supreme Court is unlikely to grant certiorari on a case involving
patent eligibility and proposing legislative amendments to the patent
statute); Gene Quinn, IPO Adopts Resolution Supporting Legislation to
Amend 35 U.S.C. § 101, IPWatchdog (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.
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the patent statute will adequately solve the problems surrounding the
Supreme Court’s treatment of eligible subject matter.
The Supreme Court’s repeated denial of certiorari in patenteligibility cases has caused many in the patent community to lose hope
that the Court will address patent eligibility in the foreseeable future.225
Hope that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to address section
101 should not be abandoned quite yet, however. With the recent split
in the Federal Circuit regarding the underlying factual issues in patent
eligibility, the use of draftsman’s art to make diagnostic method claims
patent eligible, and the continued uncertainty surrounding patent
eligibility, the time seems ripe for the Court to readdress patent-eligible
subject matter. With multiple petitions for certiorari addressing patent
eligibility currently pending before the Court, there is hope that the
Court may find that the time has come to resolve the uncertainty
surrounding patent eligibility.226 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s
split decision in Vanda seems likely to catch the Court’s attention in
light of their previous warning regarding draftsman’s art in Mayo. A
prominent patent law commentator has even called the Vanda decision
“a high flaunting of Supreme Court precedent.”227
An analysis of all of the Supreme Court’s patent law cases since
2005 further supports the Supreme Court addressing patent eligibility
in 2018; when there is patent-related legislation pending, the Supreme
Court takes at least one provision from the pending legislation and
implements it as law.228 There are currently multiple patent-related bills
ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/31/ipo-adopts-resolution-legislation-amend-101/
id=77818/ [https://perma.cc/9TBA-CZST]; Robert Stoll, Patent Bar
Groups Propose Legislation to Fix Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Problems, IPWatchdog (July 25, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2017/07/25/patent-bar-groups-propose-legislation-fix-patent-subject-mattereligibility-problems/id=86015/ [https://perma.cc/H8LL-4TWR].
225. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 136; Dennis Crouch, Denied Certiorari on
Section 101, PatentlyO (Oct. 2, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/
2017/10/denied-certiorari-section.html [https://perma.cc/97M7-DBLB];
Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., The Need for Legislative Reform: The Berkeley
Section 101 Workshop, PatentlyO (Oct. 10, 2017), https://patentlyo.
com/patent/2017/10/legislative-berkeley-workshop.html [https://perma.cc/
PP4B-2EW3].
226. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hikma Pharms. v. Vanda
Pharms., 877 F.3d 1117 (No. 18-817); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-415).
227. Dennis Crouch, Vanda on Rehearing: Will the Federal Circuit Defy
SCOTUS?, PatentlyO (June 27, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/
2018/06/rehearing-federal-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/NJM2-CFWC].
228. Paul Morinville & Gene Quinn, Will the Supreme Court Continue to Be
Influenced by Patent Reform?, IPWatchdog (Jan. 2, 2018), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/02/supreme-court-influenced-patent-reform/
id=91501/ [https://perma.cc/7W7T-WGG5].
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pending in Congress, all of which tackle patent-eligibility reform,
suggesting the Supreme Court may address patent eligibility in the near
future.229
If the Supreme Court does grants certiorari in a patent-eligibility
case, those advocating for a legislative amendment to the patent statute
believe that stare decisis will prevent the Supreme Court from altering
the Mayo/Alice framework.230 In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,
LLC,231 the Court addressed the role of stare decisis in the context of
patent law. While Kimble addressed the issue of licensing fees for
expired patents, and not statutory requirements for patentability, the
Court emphasized stare decisis in deciding not to overrule established
precedent in cases involving property law.232 The refusal to overturn
precedent went against overwhelming evidence that the precedent was
wrongly decided.233 The Court quoted Justice Brandeis that “it is
usually ‘more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.’”234 To overturn precedent, the Court stated,
there must be “‘special justification’—over and above the belief ‘that
the precedent was wrongly decided.’”235 The Court repeatedly
emphasized that it is the role of Congress and not the Court to “correct
any mistake it sees” in the Court’s interpretation of a patent statute.236
Additionally, the Court noted that “the choice of what patent policy
should be lies first and foremost with Congress.”237
The Kimble decision, however, does not destroy all hope of the
Supreme Court changing its patent-eligibility precedent. The Court
noted that the established precedent had not proved “unworkable,”238
which is a “traditional justification” for overruling precedent.239 Since
the Court’s adoption of the Mayo/Alice two-step, the precedent has

229. Id.
230. See Taylor, supra note 224, at 2157–62 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
treatment of stare decisis in patent law cases and why it is unlikely to
change the Mayo/Alice framework).
231. 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
232. Id. at 2405; see also Taylor, supra note 224, at 2159–60.
233. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412; Taylor, supra note 224, at 2159.
234. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
235. Id. (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2407 (2014)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2414.
238. Id. at 2411.
239. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
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proved entirely unworkable.240 The Mayo/Alice test lacks
administrability and has caused substantial confusion in patent
eligibility. The test fails to provide objective guidelines and leaves the
patent-eligibility determination to the subjective opinion of a judge or
patent examiner.241 The confusion caused by the Mayo/Alice test has
even led one law professor to refer to the test as “gobbledygook,” a term
borrowed from Justice Scalia in connection with another patentability
test.242 The unworkability of the current patent-eligibility test may
provide the Supreme Court the “special justification” needed to
overturn its wrongly decided precedent.
Furthermore, Kimble was not a unanimous decision; three justices
dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold its established
precedent.243 Justice Alito criticized the majority’s decision to employ
stare decisis to “reaffirm a clear case of judicial overreach.”244 He
cautioned that “stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command.’”245 In an
argument equally applicable to the Mayo/Alice precedent, Alito noted
that the established precedent in Kimble created economic barriers that
stifle innovation.246 Also, the Kimble precedent was based on policymaking more than actual interpretation of the Patent Act, so the Court
should be more open to reconsidering the precedent.247 This argument
is equally applicable to the patent-eligibility precedent—while the
Mayo/Alice test appears to be an interpretation of section 101, the
driving force behind the test was the Court’s concern with preemption.

240. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 51, at 227–35; J. Gibson Lanier, Further
Guidance and the Light at the End of the Tunnel, Smith, Gambrell, &
Russell, LLP, http://www.sgrlaw.com/further-guidance-and-the-lightat-the-end-of-the-tunnel/ [https://perma.cc/DF4V-5MNZ] (last visited
Jan. 24, 2018); Alex E. Breger, ABA Sends Letter to USPTO Director
Proposing Amendment to Resolve Ambiguity in § 101 Statutory
Interpretation, Lando & Anastasi (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.lalaw.com/
news_resources/aba-letter-to-uspto-director/ [https://perma.cc/3RCQL8VG]; Gene Quinn, Supreme Court “Abstract Idea Doctrine” Is
Unworkable, IPWatchdog (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2014/02/13/supreme-court-abstract-idea-doctrine-is-unworkable/id=47980/
[https://perma.cc/4R8S-AHN2].
241. Taylor, supra note 51, at 227.
242. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350)).
243. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2417 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2418.
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There has been a recent bipartisan push for a legislative solution to
the issues surrounding patent eligibility.248 In April 2019, Senators Tillis
and Coons, as well as Representatives Collins, Johnson, and Stivers,
released a draft outline of a potential legislative reform to patent
eligibility.249 The proposed framework is a positive step towards
resolving the current problems with patent eligibility. The draft
includes proposals that claims should be considered as a whole and that
the words “new and useful” be removed from the statute and replaced
with a simple requirement that the invention meet existing statutory
utility requirements.250 However, some language in the draft may
perpetuate the current issues with patent eligibility, rather than resolve
them. For example, the framework proposes to “statutorily abrogate
judicially created exceptions to patent eligible subject matter in favor
of exclusive statutory categories of ineligible subject matter.”251 The
proposed statutory exceptions would include: fundamental scientific
principles; products that exist solely and exclusively in nature; pure
mathematical formulas; economic or commercial principles; and mental
activities.252 These proposed statutory exceptions closely mirror the
current judicially created exceptions: abstract ideas, natural
phenomena, and laws of nature. Therefore, claims that are currently
rejected as being directed to natural phenomena or laws of nature will
likely continue to be rejected as being directed to a fundamental
scientific principle. The proposed framework also includes a “‘practical
application’ test to ensure that the statutorily ineligible subject matter
is construed narrowly.”253 However, the current Mayo/Alice approach
is already supposed to be construed narrowly, to avoid swallowing all

248. Gene Quinn, America’s Patent System Favors the Few and Inhibits
Innovation––But Change Could Be Coming, IPWatchdog (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/03/28/americas-patent-system-favorsthe-few-inhibits-innovation-but-change-could-be-coming/id=107807/
[https://perma.cc/XZ96-D6PF].
249. Press Release, Sens. Tillis and Coons and Reps. Collins, Johnson, and
Stivers Release Section 101 Patent Reform Framework, Thom Tillis (Apr.
17, 2019), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?
ID=B521846C-594A-46BE-B17A-0E11393D23AD [https://perma.cc/SKA2TH9E].
250. Draft Outline of Section 101 Reform, https://www.tillis.senate.gov/public/
_cache/files/3491a23f-09c3-4f4a-9a93-71292704c5b1/outline-of-101-reform.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JZE3-KXFL].
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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of patent law.254 Consequently, it seems unlikely that courts will
narrowly construe the statutory exceptions when the current judicial
exceptions are not narrowly construed. Furthermore, the framework
includes the proposal that “simply reciting generic technical language
or generic functional language does not salvage an otherwise ineligible
claim.”255 This proposal echoes the Court’s finding in Mayo that “simply
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make
those laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”256 Therefore, the
amendment, as currently proposed, would likely be implemented in the
same way the current Mayo/Alice test is implemented. Thus, the
current proposed framework highlights the challenges that a legislative
amendment is likely to face.
Resorting to legislative amendment in an attempt to fix patent
eligibility will provide, at best, a temporary solution to the chaos of the
Mayo/Alice two-step. In its implementation of the current patenteligibility framework, the Court has largely ignored the text of section
101, as well as the role of the other sections of the Patent Act. The
Mayo/Alice two-step, however, is grounded, not in a solid
interpretation of section 101, but in the Supreme Court’s patent policy
agenda of preventing preemption.257 The Court appears to believe that
the current approach to patent eligibility is the only way to eliminate
overly broad patents that preempt the building blocks of technology.258
Consequently, amending section 101 to overrule Mayo and Alice will
not prevent the Supreme Court from interpreting the new statute in a
manner that fits its policy agenda. This is of particular concern if the
amendment incorporates language, as currently proposed, stating that
generic technical or functional language will not salvage an otherwise
ineligible claim.259 The Supreme Court has already embraced the idea
that newly drafted patent statutes should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with precedent; in Flook, the Supreme Court embraced the
patent-eligibility standard developed in Funk Brothers in spite of the

254. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“we tread
carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of
patent law”).
255. Draft Outline of Section 101 Reform, supra note 250.
256. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 82 (2012).
257. Taylor, supra note 51, at 188–91.
258. See Taylor, supra note 224, at 2172–82 (explaining the Supreme Court’s
explicit rejection that the patent statute, rather than non-statutory
exceptions to patent eligibility is sufficient to address the Court’s concern
of preemption).
259. See supra notes 249–256 and accompanying text.
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intervening passage of the 1952 Patent Act.260 The Court reasoned, “[i]t
is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light
of our prior precedents.”261 Similarly, a statutory amendment to section
101 is likely to be read in light of the Court’s prior precedent in Mayo
and Alice. Consequently, any reference in an amendment which is
suggestive of the Court’s current eligibility test is likely to be read into
the new statute, even if that was not the intent of the drafters. This is
even more likely, despite its insistence that Congress should determine
patent policy, since the Court seems more than willing to set its own
policy agenda in regards to patent eligibility.

Conclusion: Replacing the Mayo/Alice Two-Step
In order to strengthen the U.S. patent system, encourage
innovation, and foster advancements in life-saving technologies, a new
standard for patent-eligibility needs to be established. To help ensure a
stable, enforceable patent eligibility standard, the Supreme Court needs
to realize the error in pushing their own policy on patent eligibility and
replace the Mayo/Alice two-step with a new standard. This standard
should be consistent with the text of section 101 and the Patent Act as
a whole, as well as the patent policy embraced by Congress during the
passage of the 1952 Patent Act.
In replacing the Mayo/Alice two-step, the Court needs to expressly
overrule its decisions in Mayo and Alice. Any attempt by the Court to
continue to reconcile its conflicting precedent will result in drastic
variation in the application of any new test as lower courts grapple with
how to reconcile conflicting precedent. This variation in application will
result in continued uncertainty surrounding patent eligibility.
After overruling Mayo and Alice, the Court should establish a
patent-eligibility test consistent with the Chakrabarty/Diehr precedent,
which led to the rise of innovation and technology in the United States.
The new eligibility test should depend on an analysis of the claims as a
whole and not on individual claim elements. Under the new test, section
101 should function as a gate-keeper and very coarse preemption filter.
A determination of patent eligibility should begin with claim
construction to determine the scope of the claims as a whole. The claims
of a patent define a patentee’s property rights; they delineate what the
invention is and what the patentee’s right to exclusion encompasses.
Dissecting claims into individual elements in search of an inventive
concept to transform patent-ineligible laws of nature into patent-eligible
inventions ignores what the patentee is actually able to assert as a
property right. If the driving force behind the exclusionary principle of
section 101 is to prevent preemption of the basic building blocks of
science and technology, the focus of the analysis should be on what the
260. See supra notes 78–90 and accompanying text.
261. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).
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patentee’s exclusionary right encompasses. The patentee does not have
an exclusionary right in each individual element of a claim, the
exclusionary right lies in the claim as a whole. Consequently, to
determine if a claim preempts a law of nature or abstract idea, judges
must evaluate what a patentee is able to exclude the public from doing
in regards to the claimed invention.
The Court should also make clear that patent eligibility, while a
legal question, has significant factual underpinnings. Dismissal or final
judgment on claims prior to fact finding and formal claim construction
is, therefore, improper. A correct understanding of the claims and the
boundaries of a patentee’s property rights is essential to determining if
the claim is directed to a law of nature, abstract idea, or natural
phenomena. Despite current precedent, it is inconsistent with other
patent law principles to interpret claims in a vacuum with no reference
to the patent specification or prior art. Claim language is given its
ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA), in light of the specification.262 In
interpreting claims, it is appropriate to rely on intrinsic and extrinsic
evidence.263 Claim construction carries significant importance
considering that district judges, who are charged with claim
construction,264 are not PHOSITAs and will likely not understand the
ordinary and customary meaning of claim language without context.
Even PHOSITAs must interpret the claim in light of the specification.
Furthermore, district judges rarely have technical backgrounds, which
would aid them in claim construction, and even judges with specialized
technical backgrounds may struggle with understanding technology
outside of their area of expertise. A thorough understanding of the claim
and the boundaries of a patentee’s property rights is critical to any
analysis of patent validity.265
Despite the importance of claim construction, some commentators
and practitioners continue to advocate that determining patent
eligibility prior to proper claim construction is necessary to save
resources and increase judicial efficiency.266 Courts should not, however,
be invalidating meritorious patents in the name of increasing judicial
efficiency. If increasing judicial efficiency in patent law cases is needed,

262. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
263. Id. at 1317.
264. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
265. After all, “the name of the game is the claim.” Giles S. Rich, The Extent
of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21
Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990).
266. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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other solutions, which do not invalidate good patents, should be
implemented to address these concerns.267
After claim construction, the Court should analyze patent eligibility
by applying section 101 in the manner it was intended, as a coarse filter.
Section 101 was not meant to be a burdensome, highly exclusionary
test. Patent eligibility is the gateway to determining patentability and
should let in everything except claims directed solely to the judicial
exceptions of abstract ideas, laws of nature, or natural phenomenon;
any applications of these exceptions, however, should be patent-eligible
under section 101. The “machine-or-transformation” test, while not the
only means of determining if a claim is directed solely to a judicial
exception or an application of the exception, provides an important clue
in this analysis. In readdressing patent eligibility, the Court should
make clear that, despite pulling back on the exclusive use of the
“machine-or-transformation” test in Bilski, the test is still applicable
and should carry significant weight in determining eligibility.
Finding a claim patent-eligible under section 101, however, does not
mean the claim is patentable. A claim must still satisfy the written
description, enablement, novelty, and non-obviousness requirements of
the Patent Act. These statutory requirements for patentability should
do the bulk of the work of determining a claims’ patentability on their
own and not be lumped into a section 101 analysis. While section 101
serves as a very coarse filter and excludes claims that attempt to
preempt every use of a judicial exclusion, a finer tuned preemption
analysis should be conducted under the written description and
enablement requirement of section 112. As evidenced in Morse, which
the Court has so heavily relied upon in pushing its current section 101
analysis, the written description and enablement requirement are aptly
suited for determining the scope of a claim and controlling the
preemption of basic scientific ideas. Morse’s claim was invalid, not for
being directed to ineligible subject matter, but because Morse failed to
describe and enable the claim. Thus, the Court should leave section 101
as a coarse filter to exclude claims that attempt to patent every use of
a judicial exception and allow section 112 to address more nuanced
concerns of claim scope and preemption.
Patent eligibility should, additionally, not be used to analyze the
novelty or non-obviousness of a claim. These patentability requirements
are established in sections 102 and 103, respectively, and should not be
erroneously conflated with a patent-eligibility analysis under the guise
of an “inventive concept.” As opposed to the vague “inventive concept”
found in the Mayo/Alice test, which the Supreme Court admits

267. Increasing judicial efficiency may be better addressed through the patent
pilot program or specialization of the patent court.
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overlaps with novelty and non-obviousness,268 analysis under sections
102 and 103 is better defined and based on objective standards.269 The
inventive concept should, therefore, be eliminated from eligibility
analysis and this concern left to sections 102 and 103. While section
101 mentions “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter,”270 the legislative history makes clear that the
word “new” is duplicative of section 102, which outlines how to define
novelty. The “inventive concept,” therefore, has no place in a patent
eligibility analysis.
In determining patent eligibility, Chakrabarty focused on the level
of human intervention in the claimed invention. The Court should reembrace this element of the Chakrabarty approach to patent eligibility.
Significant human intervention in a claim, along with the “machine-ortransformation” test, provides critical insight into whether a claim is
directed solely to a patent-ineligible judicial exception. Furthermore,
assessing human intervention is consistent with the intention of the
drafters of the 1952 Patent Act that everything under the sun made by
man is patent eligible.
The proposed patent-eligibility test effectively excludes claims
directed solely to laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomena
from patent protection. The test does, however, open the door to
groundbreaking applications and uses of these ineligible concepts.
Under the proposed test, a claim directed to Einstein’s theory of
relativity would be found patent ineligible. A hypothetical claim
directed to the theory of relativity reads as follows:
A method for determining a kinetic energy E of a body, the method
comprising the steps of:
Calculating a value c2, wherein the value c2 is equal to the speed
of light squared;
Multiplying the value c2 by a value m, wherein the value m is
equal to the mass of the body; and
Wherein the kinetic energy E of the body is equal to a product
of the value c2 multiplied by the value m.
The claim, analyzed as a whole, is directed to calculating kinetic
energy, which encompasses both an abstract idea—the algorithm—and
a law of nature—kinetic energy. This claim would be excluded under
section 101’s coarse filter because it preempts every use of calculating
268. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90
(2012).
269. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
270. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
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kinetic energy with the claimed algorithm. This claim illustrates,
however, why no one tool for analyzing patent eligibility is dispositive;
the claim is likely to pass the “machine-or-transformation” test because
it “transforms” the raw data into a new form, the value of kinetic energy
of a body. However, the claim preempts every use of the algorithm and
has little human intervention and is, consequently, patent ineligible.
Similarly, a claim directed to a newly discovered rock that claims a
composition of matter comprised of individually listed elements, would
also be found patent ineligible under the proposed test. Such a claim
would preempt every use of the claimed composition, would fail the
“machine-or-transformation” test, and would have no human
intervention. A new application or method involving either of these
claims would pass the proposed eligibility test and its patentability
would be decided based on sections 112, 102, and 103. Similarly, while
the claims in Mayo or Alice would pass section 101 analysis under the
proposed test, the claims would be found invalid, as they originally
should have been, under the other statutory requirements for
patentability.
The proposed eligibility test will help restore certainty to the U.S.
patent system. The test involves a workable standard that is notably
absent in the Mayo/Alice two-step. This workable standard will allow
inventors and investors to have confidence in where to invest their time
and resources. The proposed test will also protect valid, meritorious
patents from the unwarranted invalidations that result from the current
Mayo/Alice two-step. Patents directed to groundbreaking medical
discoveries, such as Sequenom’s method for determining fetal
abnormalities based on detection of cffDNA in maternal blood, would
be found eligible under the proposed test. Protecting these types of
groundbreaking innovations will promote further research and
development in medical diagnostics and treatments. By replacing the
Mayo/Alice two-step, the Supreme Court can restore the United States
“gold-standard” patent protection and foster the development of lifesaving new technologies.
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